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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS IN KANSAS AFFECTING 




The Supreme Court as the highest tribunal in the State of 
Kansas has from time to time during the Statehood of Kansas rendered 
decisions that are of importance in settling controversies between 
teachers and school district boards. In any state there is a need 
for~ higher court to see that justice is meted out to those who, 
through some misl.lllderstanding, become involved in conflicting ideas 
or opinions. Since time immortal there has been conflicting ideas 
and opinions in all societies and institutions. One result of which 
is our Supreme Court set-up. 
The purpose of this thesis is to review the Supreme Court de-
cisions affecting the status of employed teachers in Kansas. These 
decisions will be reviewed under three separate categories, namely: 
1. Teacher contracts 
2. Teacher dismissal and removal 
3. Teacher compensation 
A teacher contract as referred to in this study is an agreement between 
the teacher, as an individual and a corporate body, knoVJll as the school 
district board. Dismissal and removal are synonymous terms meaning to 
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remove from, or to terminate, or to part from. Compensation will be 
thought of as the gain or pay that is expected to be given to the 
teacher by the school district board for the services rendered by that 
teacher. 
No previous study has been made of these particular types of 
cases affecting teachers. There has been, however, a limited number 
of studies made to determine what effect supreme court decisions had 
in determining our present school systems . They are: 'Some phases of 
Kansas School Law as Determined by Suprem~ Court Decisions' by Roy A. 
Hoglund, Kansas University, 1934. 'Some Phases of School Law as De-
termined by Supreme Court Decisions' by Rolland R. Elliott, Kansas Uni-
versi~y, 1935. 'Some Phases of Kansas School Law as Interpreted by the 
State Supreme Court' by John F. Lindquist, Kansas University, 1935. 
' A Study in Educational Trends Affecting Sc ool Development in Kansas 
from the Beginning of Statehood to the Present Time' by Lavn-ence Saylor, 
Fort Hays Kansas State College, 1937. 
The material for this thesis for the most part has been pro-
cured from the reports of the decisions of the Supreme Court, known as 
the Kansas Reports . A small portion is from the reports of the Kansas 
Courts of Appeals , subsidiary courts of the Supreme Court in Kansas. 
Hatcher's digest was used as an aid to make a bibliography of the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court and the Kansas Courts of Appeals relating 
to schools. Those decisions dealing with teachers were then selected 




A contract between a teacher and a district school board signed 
by two members in the absence of each other is not binding. A contract 
with one member of the board is also insufficient. The law concerning 
the hiring of a teacher reads as follows: 1 
'Where the power is vested in a district 
board of a school district composed of three, 
to contract with and hire a teacher for and 
in the name of the district and a written 
contract is signed by two members of the board 
in the absence of each other, without consulta-
tion with each other, or vdth the other member, 
and without any meeting of the district board, 
upon the application of a par t y seeking to be 
employed as a teacher, such contract is not 
binding upon the school district. 11 
In a case before the court in 1882 brought by G. P. Ailanan v . 
School district No. 16, Butler County, the court decided in favor of 
the defendant. The opinion of the court was delivered by Horton, c. J.: 
'This action was commenced by plaintiff in 
error against defendant in error before a jus-
tice of the peace of Butler county, upon an al-
leged written contract dated in January, 1880, 
setting forth that plaintiff was employed to 
teach a school for district No. 16 of Butler 
County, for the term of three months, commencing 
on April 12, 1880, at $25. per month, to be paid 
at the end of each month. Judgment was rendered 
for plaintiff by the justice of the peace, and 
the defendant appealed to the district court. Upon 
the trial in the district court a demurrer to the 
1. Laws of Kansas 1876, ch. 122, art. 4, seo. 24. 
evidence was interposed by defendant; the court sustained 
the demurrer, and rendered judgment for the defendant. 
The plaintiff duly excepted and brings the case here. 
The question for our consideration is, whether the 
district board can bind the school district by a writ-
ten contract of the character of the one sued on, with-
out having a board meeting, at which all the members 
are present. Section 56, ch. 92, p. 830, Comp. Laws 
of 1879, reads: 'The district board in each district 
shall contract with and hire qualified teachers for 
and in the name of the district, which contract shall 
be in writing, and shall specify the wages per week or 
month, as agreed upon by the parties, and such contract 
shall be filed in the district clerk's office; and, in 
conjunction with the county superintendent, may dismiss 
for incompetency, cruelty, negligence, or immorality.' 
It is an elementary principle, that when several per-
sons are authorized to do an act of a public nature, 
which requires deliberation, they all should be convened, 
because the advice and opinions of all may be useful, 
though all do not unite in opinion. We think, in view 
of the elementary principles applicable to the duty of 
a body like the district board, consisting of several 
persons authorized to do acts of a public nature, where 
the power to contract with the person seeking employ-
ment as a teacher is vested by the statute in the 
'board,' that all must meet t ogether, or be notified 
to meet together, or have the opportunity of meeting t o-
gether, to consult over the employment of the teacher, 
before a contract can be legally entered into by them 
so as to bind the district. Certainly two members would 
have no right to exclude the third from consulting or 
acting with them, and although it is not necessary that 
all of the members of the board should be present at a 
board meeting, or that all of the members should concur 
in the making of the contract in order to bind the dis-
trict, yet the contract should be agreed upon at a meeting 
of the board where all are present, or have t he oppor-
tunity of being present••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
It appears from the evidence that A. Ailanan was direc-
tor, Martin A. Pratt Clerk, and a Mr. Turner treasurer. 
The paper was signed on the 7th or 8th of January. The 
plaintiff saw M.A. Pratt at his own house, and there ob-
tained his signature. He then presented the paper on the 
same or next day to his father, A. Ailanan, at his own 
house, and his father signed it, neither the director nor 
clerk being together at the time. It is further in evi-
dence that the plaintiff did not present the contract to 
Mr. Turner for his signature, and that he saw the clerk 
and his father, the director, separately in reference to 
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such contract; the paper was signed by the director and 
clerk in the absence of each other, and this was not 
done at any board meeting. Under these circumstances 
we can hardly see the necessity for the court to have 
submitted to the jury a:n.y question of fact about the 
contract having been signed at or after a meeting of 
the district board. The action on the part of the 
clerk and the director seems to have been taken upon 
the personal application of the plaintiff to each of 
them individually, and separately from each other. 
Taking all the circumstances together, the evidence is 
of such a nature as to preclude any fair inference 
that the officers whose signatures are to the paper 
sued on were acting under the direction of any power 
conf'erred by the district board or by any meeting of 
the board. 
••••••••••••••• At a board meeting••• ••••••••, a 
majority of the board could have ordered or entered 
into the contract, notwithstanding the other member 
dissented. 
The judgment of the district ~curt will be affirmed. 
All the Justices concurring.' 
A contract between a teacher and the school district board must 
be in writing, but it is not necessary that it be reduced to writing 
during a session of the district board; it is enough if the contract , 
though made in parol, be entered into at such sassmon; it may be re-
duced to writing and signed after the board has adjourned. In 1889 
the court reviewed a case in error from the Finney District Court and 
reversed the decision of the lower court. The decision of the lower 
court was in favor of the defendant. Charles F. Faulk v. H. L. McCart-
ney, as director of School District No . 6 of Finney County. The opin-
ion states the case. Opinion by Holt, C.: 
'This action was brought by Charles F. Faulk, 
plaintiff in error, £or the purpose of compelling 
2. Kansas Reports, Volume 27, p. 129-32. 
the defendant, as director of School District No . 6, 
Finney county, to sign an order on the district treas-
urer for the payment of $40 for wages as teacher for 
one school month. The Hon. A. J. Abbott, judge of the 
twenty-seventh judicial district, granted an alterna-
tive writ of mandamus, on January 1, 1888, in the Fin-
ney district court, a motion to quash the alternative 
writ was sustained. The plaintiff brings the case here 
for review. 
It is claimed that the alternative writ of mandamus, 
treated as the petition of plaintiff, did not state 
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, for 
two reasons: first, that it is not shown that the con-
tract between the teacher and the school district board 
was in writing; second, that the director is not required 
by law to sign the orders drawn by the clerk upon the 
treasurer for the payment of teachers' wages. In the al-
ternative writ it is alleged that the plaintiff and the 
school district entered into a contract to teach the district 
school in District No. 6 for six months at $40 per month, 
payable at the end of each month. 
The general allegations that the contract between 
plaintiff and the school district was in writing are suf-
ficient, but defendant contends that these allegations are 
limited by the following part of this writ, namely: 'That 
said written contract was entered into by and between said 
plaintiff and said school istrict in pursuance to and 
with an agreement, verbal contract, and order previously 
thereto, made and entered into by and between aaid plain-
tiff and said school district at and during a meeting of 
said school district board, held as aforesaid, prior to 
so making and entering into said agreement, verbal con-
tract, and order.' A general allegation cannot be held 
to be any broader or more effectual than the speoial cir-
cumstances that are detailed in the pleading; therefore 
we are called upon to pass directly upon the question as 
presented by the charges specially detailed as above set 
forth. There was a contract entered into between the 
plaintiff and the district board, not by a part of the 
members thereof, but by the district board; that contract, 
being in parol, was afterward reduced to writing. It may 
have been done immediately after the adjournment of the 
board; in any event, the contract is embodied in writing 
made and authorized by it. It was the contract of the 
board, and was reduced to writing. Probably a majority 
of the contracts for teachers' wages in the state are made 
in parol, and afterward reduced to writing; it may be done 
at a meeting of the district board--that is the better 
way; it may, however, be directed to be done at that time 
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and irmnediately a.:f'terward reduced to writing by the olerk; 
ordinarily the contract is signed by the director, but 
we know of no rule that would prevent the treasurer from 
signing instead of the director. The main fact to be de-
termined is, whether the board made this contract; if it 
did, it could be reduced to writing and signed by the di-
rector or the treasurer. The law requiring the written 
contract between the teacher and the district board was 
sufficiently complied with in this instance/ ••••••••••••• 
We recommend that the judgment be reversed. 
By the Court: It is so ordered. 
All the Justices concurring.' 3 
7 
A teacher suing on a contract must prove the authority of the of-
fice r s s i gning for the school district. If all members of a board 
agr ee to hire a certain teacher, but one is absent when contract is 
made-- t he contract is nevertheless good. These points of law were af~ 
f irmed by the Southern Department of the Kansas Courts of Appeals in 
the case of L. c. Brown v. School District No. 41, Cowley County, Kan-
sas in 1895. This case was in error from Cowley district court; M. G. 
Troup, judge . Judgment was for the defendant in the district court and 
affinned by the higher court. The opinion of the court was delivered 
by Cole , J.: 
'This was an action brought by plaintiff in error 
against the defendant in error in the district court 
of Cowley county, Kansas, upon an alleged written con-
tract, dated in July, 1888, setting forth that plaint-
iff in error was employed to teach school for district 
No. 41, Cowley county, for a tenn of six months, com-
mencing October 1, 1888, at $50 per month . The defend-
ant in error had judgment be l ow, and plaintiff in error 
brings the case here. 
••••••••••• It is sufficient if all are prese:mrt, or 
had an opportunity to be present, and that at least t?ro 
of them agreed to make the ~ontract in dispute . Applying 
these views to this case , it seems clear to us that the 
contract sued ·upon was one made by the district board, 
end was therefore the contract of the district. 
Plaintiff in error urges that the trial court com-
3. Kansas Reports, Volume 42, p. 695-98. 
mitted error in compelling him, after he had proven the 
execution of the contract., to assume the burden of proof 
and prove this meeting and the steps which led up to the 
completed contract. Under the pleadings in this case., 
we think the ruling of the court was correct. The peti-
tion nowhere alleges that the persons who signed the said 
contract were officers of the school district, or that 
they had authority to act for the district. It does not 
allege that the district had any officers, or who they 
were. The answer denies generally and specifically any 
authority in the persons who signed the contract to act 
for the school district, and nowhere admits that either 
of the persons so signing were officers of said district. 
There being no sufficient allegations in the petition to 
require a verified answer., the burden was upon the plaint-
iff below to prove the authority of those purporting to 
act for the district••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
The decision of the trial court is affirmed. 
All the Judges concurring. 14 
1m invalid contract will become binding on a district school 
board by ratifying the contract in accepting a teacher. In 1898 a 
case, Edna Jones v . School District No. 144, Elk County, was before 
the Kansas Courts of Appeals ., Southern Department . The decision of 
the district court., which was in favor of the defendant, was reversed. 
The opinion of the court was delivered by Milton., J.: 
'Edna Jones bring these proceedings i n error to re-
view the ruling of the district court of Elk county, 
sustaining the defendant's demurrer to her petition. 
The petition alleged that on July 22., 1891., the plain-
tiff, being then and ever sinoe duly qualified as a 
school-teacher., entered into a written contract in due 
form with the school board of the defendant district 
to teach one of the four departments of defendant's 
school for the ensuing term of eight months, beginning 
September 7. 1891, at forty dollars per month; that on 
the 30th day of July, 1891., the annual meeting of said 
district was held, and that the electors then voted 
that female teachers should be employed, but did not 
take action on any other proposition; that after said 
school meeting the district board met., and, with full 
4. Kansas Courts of Appeals., Volume 1, p . 530-6. 
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knowledge of the existence of plaintiff's contract, em-
ployed two female teachers, who, with plaintiff and other 
lady who had also been employed prior to said annual 
meeting., constituted the corps of teachers when school 
opened on September 7, 1891, for the term; that pursuant 
to the terms of said written contract., and with the full 
knowledge end consent of the school board, plaintiff 
taught in said schools for nine weeks, end was then, 
without just cause or excuse, discharged by said school 
board and not permitted to teach any longer; that plain-
tiff was paid by said board according to the terms of 
said contract at the end of the first and second months 
she so taught, and that by the unwarranted act of the 
di strict board in so discharging her, plaintiff lost .all 
opport unity of obtaining a school, and thereby suffered 
a loss of wages equal to the amount stated in said con-
tract . She prayed for judgment for the entire amount of 
her wages•••••••••••••••• 
The contract in question, i f valid when made, was en-
tire; if it beceme operative by adoption it was likelvise 
entire. The petition alleges that plaintiff was dis-
c~arged without just cause or reason. We think she is 
entitled to have the question raised decided on a trial 
of the case upon its merits. The judgment of the district 
court is reversed, and the case remanded with i nstructions 
to overrule the demurrer to plaintiff's petition. 15 
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The case of Mattie E. Parrick, Appellee, v. School Di strict No. l 
in the counties of Riley and Geary., Appellant., was before the court in 
1917. The court determined that when the teacher was allowed to teach 
and paid, the school board waives irregularities in employing her. The 
syllabus by the court: 
'Where a teacher was employed by the members of a 
school board without a formal meeting of the board 
and a contract was signed by two members of t he board 
engaging her servioes for a school term of eight months, 
and the contract delivered to her, and under such ir-
r egular employment she was permitted to teach for four 
months, and school warrants for her i s sued each month 
i n her favor and she was paid pursuant t hereto in ac-
cordance with her contract, the circumstances recited 
amount to a ratification of her irregular contract of 
employment. ,6 
5. Kansas Courts of Appeals., Volmne 7, P• 927-31. 
6. Kansas Reports., Volume 100, p. 569. 
The opi ni on of the court was delivered by Dawson, J.: 
'The plaintiff was employed as teacher in the de-
fendant school district for a term of eight months 
beginning in September 1914. The board dismissed her 
because she took an extra week's holiday at Christmas 
time without the consent of the school board. 
rt seems that it was inf orma.lly understood between 
the school board and the teacher that owing to bad 
roads end shortage of coal the midwinter vacation 
should le.st two weeks and that the school should be 
reopened on January 4, 1915. The teacher was told by 
the clerk of the board that the time could be made up 
by extending the school another week in the spring. 
The teacher was married during the vacation, and 
wrote the clerk of the school board: 'Important busi-
ness detains me for another week so I'll not be back 
until Jan. 10th. Will you please let the other chil-
dren know when I 111 be back. ' 
Thi s did not suit the members of the school board, 
and within a day or two after January 4th another 
teacher was employed. When the plaintiff appeared 
for duty the following week the clerk of the board 
informed her that on account of her taking the extra 
week she had broken her contract and had dismissed 
herself. 
After some parleying the plaintiff and the school 
board went to the county seat to have a meeting with 
the cotmty superintendent to consider the matter in 
conference with officer pursuant to the statute (Gen. 
Stat. 1915, sec. 8975), which provided that the dis-
trict board in conjunction with the county superin-
tendent may dismiss a teacher 'for i ncompetency, 
cruelty, negligence or immorality.' The only basis 
for invoting this statute was on the question of 
negligence. The county superintendent disagreed with 
the school board and stated that while she hoped the 
teacher would resign, she said: 'I told the board 
t hat I could not concur in the dismissal of t he plain-
tiff for it seemed to me she had not been sufficiently 
negligent for her dismissal ••••••• I told them (the 
board) that I thought she had not done just right i n 
adjourning school over one week •••••••• r hoped they 
(the board) would change their minds, and I made it 
plain to them that I felt I couldn't concur· i n the 
dismis sal of the teacher.' 
After the term of school closed, the plaintiff not 
having secured other professional employment in the 
interim e.nd there being no suggestion that with dili-
.HJ 
genoe she might have done so, this action was begun, 
and judgment was rendered against the school district 
for the teacher's wages for four months, which was the 
remainder of the school term according to her contract. 
The defendant school district contends th.at the con-
tract of employment was never formally entered into be-
tween the school board and the teacher, she procured 
her employment merely by interviewing the members of 
t he school board individually, and that her contract 
was executed in the same irregular way. Of course this 
pr ocedure was invalid. But pursuant to this irregular 
contract and employment the teacher was permitted to 
open school in September e.nd to teach for four months, 
and the board paid her regularly month by month for her 
services. In view of this, a defense based upon the 
irregularity of her contract of employment should not 
be countenanced. The board were more derelict than the 
t eacher. It was their duty to meet regularly each 
month and order payment of her sa lary as it became due. 
They had no right to disburse the district funds in any 
other manner. If the acts of t he school board were 
called in question for irregularly paying out the dis-
trict funds the members of the board would exercise 
t heir wits to .show· that t he district funds were dis-
bursed with sufficient regularity to relieve them per-
sonally. Doubtless they are upright men, but it is 
shown t hat they had not i n several years had a formal 
meeting as a school board, and the new teacher secured 
t o supplant the plaintiff was employed i n the s ame ir-
regular way. One member of the board t estified: ' The 
signature (to the plaintiff teacher's contract) •••••• 
looks like my wife's writing . She has signed a school 
order or two when I was not at home without my consent 
•• ••••••••••• I have been a member of the school board 
for seven or eight years ••••••••••• We have always em-
ployed the teacher without a meeting of the board. Mis s 
Martin (the new teacher) was employed the same way •••••• 
•• • I did not learn until after this trouble arose t hat 
the law required a board to meet as a board i n order t o 
elect teachers.' 
We think that since the irregularities touchi ng the 
contract of employment a.n.d its execution were t hose of 
the school board rather than those of the teacher, there 
was a sufficient ratification, for the purpose of thi s 
case, by pennitting her to teach four mont hs under her 
contract and by paying her from month to month in accord-
ance with its terms. Of course this rat ificat ion was of 
a piece with the loose, irregular conduct which had char-
11 
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acterized all the acts of the school board, but 
under the circumstances we think it was so close-
ly a.kin to ratification that it will be recognized 
as such ••••••••••••• 
The judgment is affirmed. 17 
The case of A. w. Calloway, Appellant, v. Atlanta Rural High 
School, District No . 2, Appellee, was before the court in 1930. The 
court determined that a school district board, having only such powers 
as are conferred upon district boards in charge of the common schools, 
has no power to make a valid contract of employment with a teacher 
prior to the annual meeting provided for by the statute. The opinion 
of the court was delivered by Jochems, J.: 
'This was an action on contract; the lower court sus-
tained a demurrer to plaintiff's petition and plaintiff 
appeals. 
The petition in substance stated that the plaintiff 
was by vocation a teacher, a graduate of the Kansas State 
teachers College of Emporia, and that he held a life cer-
tificate from that institution; that on February 3, 1927, 
he was then engaged in teaching the rural high school 
conducted by the defendant, having been employed for that 
school year; that on February 3, 1927, the three members 
of the school district board met and entered into a con-
tract with him in writing, whereby they employed plain-
tiff to act as principal of the rural high school con-
ducted by the defendant, for a tenn of nine months com-
mencing the first Monday of September, 1927, at a salary 
of $255 per month; that the said board was constituted 
according to the laws of the state of Kansas; that two 
of the members of said board would hold office under the 
term for which they were elected for a period of at least 
one year from and after April, 1927, and that the term of 
only one member of said board would expire in April , 1927; 
that on July 14, 1927, the plaintiff received notice by 
registered mail, purporting to be signed by the clerk and 
one of the directors of the said school board, notifying 
him that he was not the principal of the Atlanta Rural 
7. Kansas Reports, Volume 100, P• 569-72. 
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High School for the coming year and in no way connected 
with said school; that thereaf'ter he duly presented him-
self at the be ginning of the school term and signified 
his readiness to comply with his contract; that he made 
diligent efforts to obtain other employment for the 
school year, but was unable to do so and asked for judg-
ment for the full contract price for the nine months. 
There was attached to the petition a oopy of the written 
contract, which was as alleged in the petition; also 
copy of the notice of July 14, 1927. 
The plaintiff contends that the school board is an 
entity recogni zed by law independent of the names of 
the various individuals who hold the offices of director, 
clerk, or treasurer; that the school board as an entity 
is the only authority having power to employ a school 
principal or superintendent as well as teachers; that 
there is no statutory inhibition preventing the school 
dis t rict board from employing superintendents or prin-
cipals at any time after February 1, and that the school 
board had the authority to enter into the contract which 
it did enter into as of February 3, 1927. 
The defendant talces the position that the school 
board had no authority to enter into a contract with the 
plaintiff which would bind the district, prior to the an-
nual district meeting in April. 
It is conceded that the rural high school maintained 
by the defendant does not come within the provisions of 
R.S. 72-1027. This section relates to the authority of 
district boards in districts maintaining schools which 
employ ten or more full-time teachers and provides that 
such boards shall not enter into a contract prior to 
February l for a terzn beginning the following August. 
R.S. 72-3507 relates to rural high school boards and 
provides that such boards 'except as herein provided, 
shall have the powers prescribed by law for school dis-
trict boards.' It is clear, therefore, that the dis-
trict board in charge of the rural high school maintain-
ed by the defendant had only such rights, powers and 
authority as are conferred upon school district boards 
in charge of the common schools. 
The question is: Can a school district ooard created 
under the general laws governing school districts , legal-
ly contract with a teacher prior to the annual meeting, 
for a term to begin at a date subsequent to such annual 
me eting? 
Board~ of education and school district boards are 
the creatures of statutory law. The extent of their 
13 
powers and authority.mus t be determined from the 
statutes by which they are governed . School distr ict 
boards such a s the one governing the defendant are 
elected under the laws of Kansas at an annual meeting • . . . . . . . . . . 
It appears that the annual meeting of the school 
district is intended by the legislature to be a pure 
democracy. Each qual ified voter residing within the 
district is given the ri ght to appear at the annual 
meeting and there exercise his voice i n all matters 
pertaini ng to the conduct of the affairs of the 
school dis trict as outlined by the statutes. Each 
voter has the right to say, at the annual meeting in 
April, how long a term shall be conducted during the 
ensuing school year. Each voter has the ri ght like-
wise to voice his judgment as to the amount of com-
pensati on to be paid to each teacher hired by the dis -
trict. He has the further right to vote on the ques-
tion of whether any school shall be conducted by the 
district during the ensuing year . The powers of the 
school district board are clearly l imited by the ex-
press powers granted to the voters of the district to 
be exerci sed at their annual meeting. 
The legislature of this state has , as above indi-
cated, amended the laws relating to school districts 
on numerous occasions and yet it has never seen fit 
to confer expressly upon t he district board the pov,er 
to hire teachers, prior t o the annual meeting, f or 
the term following such annual meeting. If the legis-
lature of this state deemed it wise publ ic policy so 
to do it would be a simple matter for it to so amend 
the statutes. 
It is not within the province of this court to ex-
tend the statutes beyond t heir plain intendment . Un-
til the annual meeting has fi xed the length of term 
and the amount of wages t o be paid, it is manifest 
that the board is i n no position to make a contract. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Burch, J., dissenting. 18 
When a teacher misrepresented that he held certificate, it is 
equivalent t o misrepresentat ion as to educational qualifications and 
the contract is rendered unenforceable. The court affirmed the de-
8. Kansas Reports, Volume 129, P• 659-72. 
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cision of an appeal from the Clay district court in 1931, in the case 
of Virgil B. Strange, Appellant, v. School District No. 97, Appellee. 
The opinion of the court was delivered by Smith, J.: 
' The action was against a school district to collect 
de.ma.ges for the breach of a contract to employ plain-
tiff to teach school . A demurrer to the evidence of 
plaintiff was sustained. He appeals. 
The facts are that Virgil B. Strange had taken 
some work at the Kansas State Teachers College of Em-
poria some time prior to the fall of 1927. When he 
finished his work there that spring he thought he was 
entitled to a three-year certificate entitling him to 
.teach for three years in the schools of the state. He 
wrote a letter in May, 1927, to the board at Green, 
Kan., making application for a position on the faculty 
of that school. He stated therein that he was the 
holder of a three-year certificate. On the first day 
of September, 1927, appellant and appellee entered 
into a written contract whereby appellant agreed to 
teach in the school of appellee for the term beginning 
September 5 of that year, and appellee agreed to pay 
him $120 a month therefor. The contract recited t hat 
Strange was the holder of a three-year certificate. 
At this time Strange knew that that recitation did not 
state the fact. 
1/\lhen the fifth of September crune Strange presented 
himself to start teaching school under his contract. 
The superintendent of schools was informed on a visit 
to Emporia that Strange, according to the records 
there, did not have a certificate and was not entitled 
to one. He went away and stayed for the balance of 
that week. 
On the 11th day of September the board had a meet-
ing and advised plaintiff that if he would have acer-
tificate there in two days they would permit him to go 
ahead and teach. Appellant then called at the college 
and asked them to mail his certificate to the office of 
the state superintendent of pub~ic instruction at To-
peka for registration. This was done and he went there 
and obtained it. He returned to Green and the board 
told him that they had made other arrangements and would 
not need him. He thereupon sued the board of education 
for what his salary would amount to for nine months at 
$120 a month, or $1,080. 
The evidence was that there has been a misunderstand-
15 
ing at the college as to the grades of appellant. 
This was corrected by report from one of his instruct-
ors. The report should have been made in time so as 
to entitle him to certificate on January 18, 1927, 
but was not made until some time after September 5, 
1927, when the attention of the authorities of the 
college was called to the matter by the appellant. 
The certificate was then issued to him in September, 
but was dated January 18, 1927. The petition alleged, 
among other things: 'That plaintiff is the holder of 
a three-year state teacher's certificate, No. 3366, 
dated January 18, 1927, issued by the Kansas State 
Teachers College of Emporia, Kan ., which, under the 
laws of the state of Kansas, is a legal certificate, 
enabling this plaintiff to teach in the schools of the 
state of Kansas for a period of three years.' 
· Appellant argues that the provision of the section 
which permits district boards to hire 'qualified 
teachers' means that the only criterion provided for 
is the learning possessed by the applicants, and the 
word 'qualified' does not mean -to be in possession 
of a certificate. From this he reasons that since, 
under the statute it was not necessary for one to be 
in possession of any certain certificate to be qual-
ified, and since he possessed the requisite learning, 
as is evidenced by the fact that he later procured a 
certificate based on school work he had done prior to 
that time, the school dis·crict had a right to make a 
contract with him, even though he did not possess a 
certificate and since they had a right to make a con-
tract the contract they did make was binding upon them. 
He makes the argument that the courts in many states 
hold that where a teacher has the necessary qualifica-
tion and does not secure a certificate until after the 
contract is made, but before he starts to teach, the 
contract is valid. The trouble with applying that 
argument to the case at bar is this: Suppose it 
should be held that the applicant for a school was 
not required to obtain a certificate. In this par-
ticular case the school board relied upon the fact 
that he said he possessed a certificate as evidence 
that he did have the educational qualifications be-
fore entering into the contract ••••••••••• 
All these things appeared in the evidence presented 
by appellant in support of his petition and this evi-
dence not only failed to show any ground entitling 
plaintiff to the relief prayed for in that petition, 
but had it been amended so as to conform with the proof 
.J.U 
that was offered, still the appellant would not have 
been entitled to judgment. 
We conclude that the motion to pennit an amendment 
to the petition was rightfully overruled and that the 
demurrer to evidence of appellant was rightfully sus-
tained and the decision is af'firmed.,9 
.. 
On March 4, 1929, the Sherman county high school board met in 
regular session with all members present, and voted to employ B. R. 
Petrie as a teacher for the ensuing school year, and fixed his salary 
at $2,250. The clerk's record of the meeting fully and accurately dis-
closed the action of the board. B. R. Petrie orally accepted employ-
ment on the terms stated • .Af'ter the oral acceptance, and on March 18, 
the board formally rescinded its action of March 4, and voted not to 
hire Mr. Petrie. The case of B. R. Petrie , Appellee, v. The Sherman 
County Community High School and the Board of Education of the city 
of Goodland, Appellants, was before the supreme court in the January 
term 1932. The judgment of the district court in favor of Mr. Petrie 
was reversed by the supreme court. The supreme court held there was 
no contract. The opinion of the court was delivered by Burch, J.: 
'The action was one by a school teacher to recover 
for breach of contract of employment. The verdict and 
judgment were in his favor, and the community high 
school, which he claimed made the contract of employ-
ment with him appeals. The points in the case are, 
first, whether a written contract was required by stat-
ute, and if so, what the legislature meant by a written 
contract •••••••••••• 
On March 4 the community high school board met in 
regular session at Goodland, with all members present, 
and the minutes of the meeting show plaintiff was elect -
ed to teach vocational agriculture for the ensuing 
school year, beginning August 10, at a salary of $2,250. 
9. Kansas Reports, Volume 132, p. 268-72, 1931. 
Authority of this meeting to do what the minutes 
show was done is not contested by either plaintiff 
or defendants. Within a day or two plaintiff did 
what was sufficient to constitute oral acceptance 
<i: employment on the terms stated, and asked the 
secretary if his contract had been mailed out, since 
he had not yet received it. The secretary replied 
they were out of blanks, were having blanks printed, 
and as soon as the blanks were received the contract 
would be sent out. 
On March 18 the board met again, formally rescinded 
the action of March 4, voted not to employ plaintiff, 
and immediately after the vote was taken notified 
plaintiff he would not be employed. The work of teach-
ing vocational agriculture includes summer work--over-
seeing home-work projects of students, getting new 
students, and doing community work among farmers of 
the district. Plaintiff testified that on August 10 
he 'began teaching.' When school re gularly commenced 
about September 10, plaintiff appeared at the school-
house, and on the second day of school he found him-
self locked out ••••••••••• 
The petition stated facts sufficient to raise the 
legal questions which have been discussed. The peti-
tion contained a count for damages· in the entire sum 
of $2,250, and contained a co1mt for a month's salary 
earned between August 10 and time school regularly 
commenced in September. A demurrer to the petition 
was overruled. There was no allegation (nor proof ) 
that the board knew plaintiff was •teaching' before 
school commenced. It was alleged (~d proved) that 
about September 10 (when plaintiff reported for duty 
at school) he was locked out. Since the action of 
the board on March 4 did not result in a contract, it 
availed plaintiff nothing to obtrude himself into the 
school's affairs under an unfounded claim he was legal-
ly employed. 
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and 
the cause is remanded with direction to sustain the 
demurrer to the petition. 
Dawson, J., · not sitting.,lO 
In the month of May, 1931. Betty Chaffin Grimison. a woman teach-
er. contracted with the Board of Education of Clay Center, Kansas to 
10. Kansas Reports, Volume 134, P• 464-70, 1932. 
teach school for nine months commencing with the opening of the school 
term in the following September. The contract provided that marriage 
of the teacher during the term of the contract would automatically term-
inate the contract. She married in June of the same year, and when 
school commenced in September the board of education refused to permit 
her to teach. The supreme court upheld the decision of the Clay dis-
trict court. The contract was held valid, and was automatically term-
inated by the teacher's marriage . The case was Betty Chaffin Grimis on, 
Appellant v . The Board of Education of the City of Clay Center, Apellee. 
The opinion of the court was delivered by Burch, J.: 
'The action was one by a school teacher against a 
boa.rd of education for breach of contract of employ-
ment to teach school. A demurrer to the petition was 
sustained, and plaintiff appeals. In May, 1931, the 
board of education of the city of Clay Center employed 
Betty Chaffin, a single woman, to teach in the city 
schools for nine months, beginning with the opening of 
school in September, 1931. The contract of employment 
was in writing and contained the following stipulation: 
'A further stipulation is that the 
marriage of a lady teacher during the 
term for which her contract is made 
automatically abrogates said contract . ' 
In June, 1931, Betty Chaffin married J. G. Grimison. 
When school opened in September the board of educat ion 
refused to recognize Mrs. Grimison as an employed teach-
er. 
Plaintiff contends her contract was not automatically 
abrogated since she married before school commenced and 
not within the term for which she was employed. The con-
tract related to status of a woman teacher during . the 
term for which she was employed, and plaintiff's engage-
ment vras that if she changed her status, so that she 
would not be single during the term of employment the 
contract was abrogated when the change occurred. 
Plaintiff contends that if the contract be inter-
preted as just indicated, the provision relating to 
marriage is void and should be disregarded . This 
would leave a valid contract of employment which the 
school district refused to perform. 
••••••••••••The board of education was charged 
with sole control over the schools of the city. No 
man and no woman has a right protected by law to be 
employed as a teacher by the board of education of 
the city of Clay Center. No constitutional, statu-
tory or connnon-law right of any woman would be in-
fringed if the board refused, for any reason, to em-
ploy female teachers. Tender of employment to a woman 
may be on such terms as the board may deem to be for 
the best interest of the school, and acceptance of 
terms by an applicant for employment constitutes 
waiver of privilege to object to them • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
We do not have here a case of discharge of a teach-
er for some reason, good, bad or indifferent. The case 
is one in which a person presented herself as a teacher 
who had no contract of employment with the board of ed-
ucation, and the board was not bound to recognize her 
as a teacher. Likewise, we have no case of arbitrary 
or capricious exercise of power by the board of educa-
tion. Plaintiff and the board of education agreed on 
terms of employment. Plaintiff exercised her privi-
lege to marry and thereby terminated her employment. 
The judgment of the distri ct court is affirmed.,11 
The district board of a common-school district is powerless to 
perform an official act when meeting outside the geographical limits 
of the school district. In a case, J . Warren Dunfield, Appellant v. 
School District No. 72 in Coffey County, Appellee , the court affirmed 
a decision of the district court in favor of the defendant. The 
opinion of the court was delivered by Thiele, J.: 
'This was an action by a school teacher to re-
cover salary under an alleged written contract of 
employment. 
In his petition plaintiff alleged his qualifica-
11. Kansas Reports, Volume 136, p. 511-14, 1934. 
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tions as a teacher; that on April 9, 1932, at a 
regular meeting of the school district board held 
at the office of the county superintendent of Cof-
fey county, a contract, in writing was entered into 
whereby plaintiff was employed as a teacher of a 
period of eight months commencing September 5, 1932, 
and ending with the school year in 1933, at a salary 
of $72.50 per month; that on September 5, 1932, plain-
tiff presented himself at the schoolhouse of the dis-
trict prepared to teach the school and was informed 
that he would not be permitted to do so and that the 
contract was not recognized. Plaintiff claimed dam-
ages by reason of the breach of the alleged contract 
covering his salary at the rate of $72.50 per month 
with interest at 6 per cent upon each monthly payment 
as it became due •••••••••••• 
Appellant contends that a verbal contract was made 
in the district and reduced to writing at the county 
seat, and that the boa.rd had power to contract outside 
the geographical limits of the district . Although 
there is contention about the oral contra.ct, it clear-
ly appears from the testimony that if any oral agree-
ment was made between plaintiff and two members of the 
boa.rd, it was before the meeting with the third member, 
and when they came to his home, and as soon as the ques-
tion of regularity of the school meeting and of their 
power to act was raised, t e plaintiff and the members 
of the board without agreeing on plaintiff's employment 
or anything else so far as the record shows, went to 
the county seat and had the meeting above mentioned. · 
The only evidence of an oral contract is that, prior to 
the meeting with the third member, plaintiff and two 
members of the boa.rd agreeing upon plaintiff's employ-
ment. At the time there was no meeting of the board 
and no notice to the third member, and a binding con-
tract could not be made ••••••••••••••• 
There being no statute authorizing the meeting of 
the board at the county seat end outside the geograph-
ical limits of the district, its action at such meeting 
was invalid and the contract was a nullity. 
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. 
Hutchison, J., not sitting. 1 12 
On April 20, 1931, a school district contracted with a teacher to 
12. Kansas Reports, Volume 138, P• 800-2, 1934. 
teach in the district school for a term of nine months, beginning Sep-
tember 7, 1931, at a stated salary, subsequently, and before September 
7, 1931, the district was consolidated with another district. The teach-
er was not employed by the board of the consolidated district, and she 
was unable to obtain employment during the term specified in her con-
tract. In an action against the consolidated district the teacher re-
covered judgment. The case before the court in 1934 was Inez Hill Fuller, 
Appellee, v. Consolidated Rural High-school District No. 1 in Pottawatomie 
County, Appellant. The opinion of the court was delivered by Burch, J.: 
'The action was one by a school teacher to recover 
from a consolidated school district on her written con-
tract to teach school made with one of the districts 
entering into the consolidation. Plaintiff recovered 
and defendant appeals. 
Pursuant to the practice of engaging teachers in 
the spring for the school year beginning the next fall, 
the board of a school district, which, for convenience , 
may be called the Louisvi lle district, entered into a 
contract with plaintiff t o teach school for a term of 
nine months, commencing September 7, 1931. The con-
tract was signed on April 20, 1931, was in the form pre-
scribed by the state department of education, and pro-
vided that plaintiff should be paid a salary of $145 
per school month, payable monthly. After the contract 
was signed, petitions were circulated i n the Louisville 
district for the calling of an election to vote on a 
proposition to consolidate the district with another, 
which, for convenience, may be called the Wamego dis-
trict . The election was held on June 16, and the vote 
was favorable to consolidation. On June 29 the Wamego 
district voted to consolidate. The county superintend-
ent designated the consolidated district as Consoli-
dated Rural High School District No. 1 Pottawatomie 
county, Kansas. About July 13 officers constituting a 
school board for the consolidated district were elected. 
The consolidation proceedings were instituted and con-
smmnated pursuant to Laws 1931, chapter 275. School 
opened in the consolidated district at Wamego on Sep-
tember 7. Plaintiff was not employed as a teacher in 
the school of the consolidated district. On September 
7 plaintiff, with other teachers and the principal of 
the Louisville school, reported for duty and conducted 
school at the Louisville schoolhouse for several days, 
when they were served by the sheriff with notice from 
the board of the consolidated district to desist and 
to surrender school property ••••••••••• 
Plaintiff was ready and willing at all times to 
perform the contract on her side, and could not find 
employment within the school year. It is contended, 
however, she did not diligently seek employment by 
the consolidated district board • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Actions against defendant by two other teachers, 
Dorothy Hinman and Dorothy Mayden, were consolidated 
for trial in the district court with the Fuller action, 
arid judgments were rendered in favor of plaintiffs in 
those cases. It is stipulated that this appeal shall 
be determinative of the three cases. 
The judgment of the district court in each case is 
affirmed. 
1 Johnston, c. J., and Hutchison, J., not sitting.' 3 




TEACHER DISMISSAL AND REMOVAL 
A teacher may be discharged at any time he fails to give satis-
faction if the contract so reserves that right. In a case before the 
supreme court in 1872, the decision of the district court was reversed. 
The district court had decided in favor of Wm. D. Colvin, a teacher, 
who had sued School District No. 5 in the county of Wyandotte. Action 
by Colvin on the following contract: 
'It is hereby agreed by and between school-dis-
trict No. 5, county of Wyandotte, state of Kansas , 
and William D. Colvin, a legally qualified teacher, 
that said teacher .is to take, govern, and conduct 
the public school of said district to the best of 
his ability, keep a register of the daily attend-
ance and studies of each pupil belonging to the 
school, and make other records as the board may re-
quire, with the report required by law, and endeavor 
to preserve in good condition and order the edifice, 
grounds, furniture, apparatus, and such other dis-
trict property as may come under his i nnnediate super-
vision as such teacher for a term of six months, com-
mencing on the ninth day of September, 1870. And the 
said school-district hereby agrees to keep the school-
house in good repair; to provide the necessary fuel 
and school registers; and for the services of said 
teacher, as aforesaid shown, well and truly perform-
ed, to pay said teacher the sum of three hundred and 
sixty dollars on or before the expiration of said 
school; the district board reserving the right to 
discharge the teacher at any time he fails to give sat-
isfaction to said board ••••••••• 1 
The opinion of the court by Kingman, c. J.: 
1. Kansas Reports, Volume 10, P• 216. 
' The defendant in error engaged to teach a school 
for the plaintiff in error for six months, under a 
written contract whi ch contained this clause: ' The 
district board reserving t he right to discharge the 
teacher at any time he fails to give satisfaction to 
said board.' Under this contract defendant in error 
taught the school for three and a half months, and 
was then discharged by the board. He was paid for 
the fuml time he taught, and brought his action to 
recover for the residue of the six months. It was 
proven on the trial that he failed to give satisfac-
tion to the board, and for that reason he was dis-
charged ••••••••••••••• It would be a public calamity 
if a teacher employed for a year should prove negli-
gent or immoral, and there was no way to rid the dis-
trict of such a teacher. It was wise in such a case 
to make provision by law for his discharge, and it 
was thought wise to connect the county superintendent 
with the board in any such action. If all the con-
tracts were made as the one in this case is made, 
there would be no necessity for such enactment. The 
law was made for the benefit of the district . It 
does not prevent the board from making any other con-
tract with the teacher. In this case they have made 
one which is not prohibited either by law or public 
policy. No one doubts that a contract hiring a 
teacher might be abrogated by mutual consent. So 
they may stipulate in advance, as in this case, what 
shall put an end to the contract. That contingency 
arose, and the board, with the previous consent of 
the teacher, put an end to the contract. There 
seems to be no doubt but what that part of the con-
tract was valid. 
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded 
for further proceedings. 2 (All the justices concurring). 
A school board may discharge a teacher without a formal trial, 
for incompetency after giving notice , if it is so stipulated in the 
contract. ).n action was brought by A. Laura Armstrong against Union 
School-District No . l, Dickinson e.nd Saline counties, for dam.ages al-
leged to. have been caused by the defendant I s illegal dismissal of the 
2. Kansas Reports, Volume 10, P• 216-19. 
..,.., 
plaintiff as a school-teacher of the said Union School-district. The 
opinion of the court in 1882 by Valentine, J.: 
'It is admitted by counsel for both parties that 
the only question involved in this case is whether 
the plaintiff, A. Laura Armstrong, was legally dis-
m.iseed as a school-teacher from the public school 
held in Union school-district No. 1, Dickinson and 
Saline counties, Kansas. She was employed as a 
school-teacher by such school-district on September 
6, 1881, and immediately entered upon the discharge 
of her duties as such school-teacher. The contract 
of employment was such as is generally used in the 
employment of a teacher, except that it contained the 
following proviso, to-wit: 'and provided, further 
that if by the inability or neglect of the said .Arm-
strong the interests of the school shall suffer, the 
district board shall have full power to annul this 
contract, after one month's written notice.' 
The plaintiff continued to teach in said school-dis-
trict up to April 4, 1881, when the school board 
finally dismissed and discharged her, on the ground 
of inability and neglect . This was done in pursuance 
of a written notice previously given to her and serv-
ed upon her, March 5, 1881 •••••••••• She therefore 
claims that the dismissal was illegal and void for 
two reasons: First, because she did not have a form-
al trial; second, because the school-district board 
in dismissing her did not act in conjunction with the 
county superintendent • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
As to the mode of procedure by the school board 
in coming to a determina.tion whether it would dis-
charge the plaintiff or not, under the contract we 
think it had an almost unlimited discretion. Neither 
the contract nor the statute provides what the mode 
of procedure should be in such cases •••••••• 
This is substantially all there is in the case. 
Counsel for plaintiff suggest some other ques_tions; 
but having decided the main questions involved in 
the case as we have, and under the circumstances of 
the case, we do not think that it is necessary to 
comment upon them. The judgment of the court below 
will be affirmed. 3 Brewer , J.; concurring; Horton, c. J ., dissenting.' 
3. Kansas Reports, Volume 28, P• 246-51. 
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The f ormality of a court is not required in the dismissal of a 
teacher. The directors of a school district may discharge a school 
teacher for incompetency or neglect of duty; but afterward, if they are 
sued by the teacher for the sum agreed to be paid him, it is then nec-
essary for the directors to show that the teacher was dismissed for in-
competency or neglect of duty, and that in fact he was incompetent, or 
that he neglected his duty. In a case before the court in 1883 , Joseph 
McCoy had brought suit against School District No. 23, in Bourbon county, 
to r e cover for wages claimed by him as a teacher in said district. The 
district court gave the plaintiff judgment against the defendant school 
district . The supreme court , however, reversed the decision of the dis-
trict court. The opinion of the court was delivered by Valentine, J .: 
'••••••••••••• It appears from the record, that on 
September 11, 1880, the school district employed 
McCoy t o teach a school r or eight months in that dis-
trict, f or $40 per month. He taught the school from 
September 13 , 1880, up to January 4, 1881, when he 
was discharged by the district board, in conjunction 
with the county superintendent of public instruction, 
for incompetency. Previous to this discharge, the 
district board requested the county superintendent 
to act in conjunction with it in an investigation of 
the charge of incompetency on the part of McCoy; and 
McCoy was notified of such proposed investigation, 
and at his request the investigation was adjourned a 
few days , and set for January 4, 1881. On that day 
the school-district board, in conjunction with the 
county superintendent, met at the district school 
house for the purpose of investigating the charge. 
McCoy and his attorney appeared, as did also a large 
proportion of the people of the district, including 
the school children • .An investigation was had, but 
not upon writ ten charges nor evidence under oath, but 
upon oral testimony, not under oath . The district 
board and county superintendent decided to discharge 
McCoy, and did discharge him; but no record of the 
discharge nor of any of the proceedings was kept or 
made. The board, however, at the time paid McCoy 
in full for his services up to that time. and made 
an entry of such payment on its records •••••••••• • 
It seems to us that the district court committed 
error. The whole of the statute with reference to 
proceedings for the dismissal of school teachers is 
as follows: 
' The district boar d in each 
district, •••• in conjunction with 
the county superintendent , may 
dismiss (a school teacher) for 
incompetency, cruelty, negligence , 
or immorality.' 
There is no statute anyv,here to be found provid-
ing, either in terms or by implication, that the 
school-district board and the county superintendent 
when a cting together shall constitute a court . There 
is no provision defining who shall be the presiding 
officer in such cases, or whether there shall be any 
presiding offi cer; no provision for a clerk, or sher-
iff, or marshall, or constable , or any other officer 
except themselves . There is no provision for the 
issuing or serving of writs or process ; no provision 
for the filing of any pleadings ; no provision for ad-
ministering oaths to witnesses , or even for hearing 
the testimony of witnesses; no provision for reduc-
ing the proceedings to writing, or for preserving 
any record of the same; no provision for keeping any 
records; no provision for appeal or petition in error; 
nothing, in fact, in all the statutes that even 
squints toward the idea that the school-district board 
acting in conjunction with the county superintendent, 
in the dismissal of a school teacher, acts as a court 
••••••••••••••••• it was held that the directors of a 
school district may undoubtedly discharge a school 
teacher for incompetency or neglect of duty; but that 
afterward, if they are sued by the teacher for the sum 
agreed to be paid him, it devolves upon the directors 
to show that the teacher was dismissed for incompetency 
or neglect of duty, and that in fact he was incompetent 
or that he neglected his duty. 
After a careful examination of this case, we are 
satisfied that the district court erred, and that its 
GO 
judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded for 
a new trial. 
All the Justices concurring. 14 
A provision in a teacher's contract for discharge if not satisfac-
tory to the school board is valid. The case of L. C. Brovm v. School 
District No. 41, Cowley County, Kansas, has been explained in Chapter II . 
L. c. Brown had contracted to teach the school of District No. 41. The 
contract contained a clause that provided for the teacher's discharge if 
he was not satisfactory to the school board. Mr . Brown was discharged 
before he started to teach the school. The supr eme court affi rmed the 
decision of the district court , which ad decided in favor of the defend-
ant school district. The opinion of the court delivered by Cole, J .: 
1 •••••••••• The facts i n this case are that, be-
fore the time arrived for the plaintiff i n error to 
enter upon his duties under the contract, a large 
majority of the qualified electors of said district , 
at a school-district meet ing re gularly called and 
held fo r the purpose of set t ling the question as to 
whether they would retain or dismiss plaintiff i n 
error, expressed their dissatisfaction, and voted 
to dismiss him; and upon the authority of such vote , 
and after adopting a resolution of similar i mport 
at a board meeting, the said board notified plain-
tiff in error in writing of the fact that the dis-
trict did not desire his services; and when the 
t i me arrived for school to commence he appeared 
and demanded the right to teach, and they refused 
to permit him to do so. In instructing the jury 
upon this clause in the contract, and under the 
evidence aforesaid, the court said, i n substance, 
that this clause did not give either board or the 
district the right to dismiss the plaintiff in error 
without any cause or excuse, but that its import was 
that at any time the board or the majority of the 
district had ~easonable ground f or dissatisfaction 
4. Kansas Reports, Volume 30, p. 268-76. 
they might dismiss the plaintiff in error and that 
the question for the jury to settle upon this par-
ticular point was whether or not at the t:un.e when 
the plai ntiff was dismissed either the board or a 
majority of the district had reasonable grounds for 
such dismissal . The court further instructed the 
jury that it was not absolutely necessary, under the 
contract, that the plaintiff should have had an op-
portunity to t ry his hand at teaching school before 
such dismissal took place or the district or the 
members of the board had reasonable ground t o be-
lieve that pl aintiff would not prove satisfactory •••• 
The decision of the trial court is affirmed . 
All the Judges concurring . 1 5 
A teacher in a city of the second class cannot be removed be-
30 
fore the end of the school term without cause . In the case before the 
court in 1896, The Board of Education of the Ci ty of Ottawa v. Jennie 
Cook, the decis i on of the lower court in favor of Jennie Cook was af-
firmed. The contract contained the follovring, 'unles s sooner removed 
by vote of the board.' It was dec ided that the clause did not specify 
thecauses for which a teacher might be removed, nor can it be construed 
to mean that the teacher may be removed without cause. The opinion of 
the court delivered by Dennison, J .: 
'This action was brought in the district court 
of Fr a.ri.klin county by Jennie Cook, as plaintiff, 
against the Board of Education of the city of Otta-
wa, Kan., as defendant, to recover the runou_~t claim-
ed to be due her as wages under a contract to teach 
in the public schools of Ot tawa . The record dis-
closes the fact that she was elected by the board to 
teach in the schools for the school year of 1890- '91 
at $45 per month, and that she accepted the emplor-
ment and entered upon her duties and taught for 62 
months. The board paid her for six months' service 
5. Kansas Courts of Appeals, Vo l ume 1, P• 530-7. 
only ••••••••••••••• 
One of the rules and re gulat i ons of the board of 
education for the year 1890-' 91 is the follovnng: 
' SECTION 1. ( See section 204, Schools Laws of Kan-
sas.) At the regular meeting in June, or as soon 
thereafter as practicable, the board shall elect the 
teachers of the public schools , to hold their posi-
tions for one year unle ss sooner removed by vote of 
the board.'•••••••••••••• 
The board could not, therefore, legally remove 
Miss Cook by a vote except for a sufficient cause , 
and the question was properly submitted to the jury 
as to whether there was sufficient cause for removal . 
To decide otherwise , and t o hold t hat the words 'un-
less sooner removed by vote of the boa.rd ' must be 
construed to mean that the board might remove with-
out ca.use , or at its pleasure or caprice, would be 
doing violence to all knovm definitions of words or 
construction of sentences . The only rational in-
terpretation of the whole contract, including the 
rules of the board, is that all parties recognize 
that there are causes for which a teacher may be re-
moved, and the board employed Miss Cook to teach in 
the city schools for the ensuing year, unless removed 
by vote of the board for suffi cient cause. The case 
was tried by both sides upon the theory that the 
boar d must justify the r emoval of Miss Cook by her 
actions, and the answer of the board to the petition 
filed herein and all the evidences were directed to-
ward showing that she continually violated the rules 
of the board, and that she inflicted extremely cruel 
punishment upon the pupils in her room. This ques-
tion was properly submitted to the jury, and they 
found in favor of Miss Cook •••••••••••• 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
All the Judges concurring. 16 
31 
The act of a school-board, in conjunction with the county super-
intendent, of dismissing a teacher is conclusive in t he absence of fraud, 
corruption, or oppression. In the case of School District No . 18, of 
·Kearny County, Kansas, v . Levvis Davies , the supreme court reversed the 
6. Kansas Courts of Appeals , Volume 3, p. 269-74. 
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decision of the district court . The district court found in favor of 
Mr . Davies . This case was before the court in 1904. The opinion of the 
court was de l ivered by Atkinson, J . : 
' On August 10, 1901, school district No. 18 of 
Kearny county, entered into a written contract with 
Lewis Davies to teach school for a tenn of eight 
months, to commence on September 30 following, at a. 
salary of $40 per month, payable at the end of each 
school month . Davies commenced work under this con-
tract and continued t o teach, receiving payment 
therefore, until January 31, 1902, when he was dis-
missed by the district board, acting in conjunction 
with the county superintendent, on a charge of inoom-
pe tency, cruelty, and negligence • 
•• •• • ••• • • • • The record discloses that at a meeting 
of the district board in conjunction with the county 
superintendent , on January 31, 1902, plaintiff was 
dismissed on the charge of incompetency, cruelty alld 
negligence . There was no claim of fraud, corruption 
or oppression in the action of dismissal ••••• ••••••• • 
It is manifest that the intention of the l egis-
lature in enacting section 6184 was to provide a 
speedy and inexpensive mode for the dismissal of 
teachers from the distri ct schools . We believe that 
the legislature established this tribunal, clothed 
with the pov,er to dismiss , with the intention that 
its acts should be final. The teacher takes his em-
ployment with the knowledge of this power and it 
enters into his contract of hire, however made or 
formulated. We can see no purpose or object of the 
legislature in joining the county superintendent with 
the district boa.rd and gi·v-ing the t ribunal thus cre-
ated the power to dismiss teachers unless it was in-
tended that, in the absence of fraud, corruption, or 
oppression, its acts should be final and conclusive. 
It would tend greatly to impair the government and 
efficiency of the public schools if the honest judg-
ment and discretion of this tribunal, so exercised, 
were subject to review. 
'!'he jud~ent of the district court is r eversed. 
All the Justices concurring. 7 Maff6n, J., not sitting, having been of counsel .' 
7. Kansas Reports, Volume 69, P• 162-7 . 
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The unanimous decision of the county superintendent and two members 
of a school board is sufficient for the dis.missal of a teacher. The 
school board and county superintendent constitute the proper tribunal to 
determine a teacher's dismissal. These were points brought out in the 
case of Laura Duncan, Appellee, v. School District No. 8 of Reno County, 
Appellant, by the court in 1910. The decision of the district court of 
Reno county was reversed by the supreme court. The district court had 
given judgment to Laura Duncan, Appellee . The opinion of the court was 
delivered by Smith, J.; 
1 ••••••••• The contract in the usual form was signed 
by two members of the board and the teacher. 
The appellee entered upon her duties as such teach-
er and continued thereafter to teach until the 25th 
day of November, 1907, when she was served with a not-
ice , signed by all the members of the school board and 
the county superintendent, to close the school, and 
that she was dismissed on charges of incompetency and 
negligence, and the schoolhouse was closed against her . 
She was paid full wages, according to the terms of the 
contract, for the time she taught the school. After 
the expiration of the term for which she was employed 
she brought this action to recover the amount of the 
wages unpaid, at the rate prescribed in the contract . 
A trial was had to the court and a jury, and a verdict 
was returned in favor of the teacher for the full 
amount claimed ••••••••••••••••• 
Testifying in regard to the meeting with the two 
members of the board, the county superintendent said, 
in substance, that they wanted her to quit and she 
was unwilling to do so, end he told them they could 
not dismiss her without his consent; they made com-
plaint that she did not keep order, and that the chil-
dren were not learning anything; that he told them he 
was ready to pass his judgment, and there was only one 
way to do it, and that by acting as they thought it 
should be done; that they said she should quit; that 
he and the two members of the board agreed in every 
respect; ••••••••••••••• 
As before stated, there was no evidence contradict-
ing these s~atements. rt is not contended but that 
the evidence of the plaintiff was sufficient to just-
ify the verdict and judgment, if she was not legally 
dismissed. At the conclusion of the evidence the court 
was requested in writing to instruct the jury to return a 
verdict in favor of the defendant, and we see no reason 
why this instruction should not have been given ••••••• 
The request for an instruction to return a verdict 
for the defendant should have been allowed, and the 
motion for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict 
was not sustained by the evidence, should have been 
sustained. The judgment is therefore reversed, and 
the case is remanded with instructions to render judg-
ment in favor of the defendant. 18 
The conduct of a teacher in extending a vacation without consent 
34 
of the school board is a question of negligence. The dismissal of a 
teacher for negligence requires the concurrence of county superintendent. 
The case of Mattie E. Parrick, Appellee, v. School District No. 1, in the 
Counties of Riley end Geary, Appellant, has been explained in chapter II . 
It was informally understood between the school board and the teacher, 
Mattie Parrick, that the vacation at Christmas time would be for a two 
weeks period, due to bad roads and the shortage of coal . The teacher 
was married during the vacation and wrote to the clerk of the school 
board that she would not be back until Jan. 10th, which date would ex-
tend the vacation another week. This did not suit the school board. 
When the teacher returned from her extended vacation she found another 
teacher hired to teach the district school. The school board maintained 
that she was dismissed because of negligence. The county superintendent 
did not concur in the action with the school board. The supreme court 
8. Kansas Reports , Volume 83, P• 580-5. 
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affirmed the decision of the lo,ver court that Mattie Parrick could not 
have been dismissed by the school board without the concurrence of the 
county superintendent . The opinion of the court was delivered by Dawson, J .: 
'••••••••••••••.Ai'ter the term of school closed, 
the plaintiff not having secured other professional 
employment in the interim and there being no sugges-
tion that with diligence she might have done so, 
this action was begun, and judgment was rendered 
against the school district for the teacher ' s wages 
for four months, which was the remainder of the school 
term according to her contract ••••••••••• 
Turning now to the ground of the teacher ' s dis-
missal for negligence: The statute provides that the 
sanction of the county superintendent is necessary 
to dismiss a teacher f or that delinquency. For 
reasons which seemed sufficient to the county super-
intendent, she withheld her concurrence therein. 
The county superintendent had a right to exercise 
her dis cretion--her own judgment--with due consid-
eration t o all the circumstances. With the exercise 
of that discretion the court has no right to inter-
fere . It is not enough that the court mi ght think 
the circumstances sufficient to justify the dismis-
sal of the teacher ••••• • • •••• , the authority for dis-
missing a teacher for negligence , etc., is not vested 
in a mere majority of four persons , the three members 
of the board and superintendent, but requires the in-
dependent as sent of the superintendent in addition to 
that of the board. Whi le the assent of a majority of 
the school board, the independent concurrence of the 
superintendent being withheld and denied, the pretend-
ed dismissal of the teacher was of no legal effect •••• 
••••••••• In this way the legislature, in its wisdom, 
has sought to safeguard district school teachers from 
dismissal without sufficient cause or through arbi-
trary action, caprice or injustice on the part of the 
school board............ 9 The judgment is affirmed.' 
In the case of Nellie Brady Morris, Appellee, v . School District 
No. 40 Joint in Lyon County, Appe llant, before the court in 1934, the 
9. Ka.nsas Reports, Volume 100, P• 164- 9. 
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supreme court reversed the decision of the district court. The district 
had found in favor of the plaintiff, Nellie Brady Morris, suing for wages 
due her , after what she termed an illegal dismissal . The opinion of the 
court was delivered by Burch, J.: 
'The action was one by a school teacher, who was 
dismissed before her term of employment expired, to 
r ecover, from the school district which employed her , 
salary for the portion of the term remaining after 
dismissal . The verdict and judgment were for plain-
tiff, and the district appeals ••••••• • ••• 
Plaintiff alleged she was dismissed without just 
cause or legal excuse., that she was qualified (not 
incompetent) to teach, and had not been guilty of 
cruelty, negligence , or immorality . There was no 
allegation the boar d had not acted in conjunction 
with the county superintendent., there was no allega-
tion of facts showing the board acted fraudulently., 
corruptly, or oppressively, and the petition did 
not state a cause of action. It was for the board, 
in con j unction with the county superintendent, to 
determine whether there was just cause or excuse for 
dismissal ••••••••••• • • 
The board was required by statute to act in con-
junction with the county superintendent, and did so . 
The fact that the joint act of dismissal occurred 
outside the territorial limit of the school district 
did not detract from the validity of the dismissal • • • • 
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and 
the cause is remanded with direction to render judg-
ment in favor of defendant . ,lO 
10 . Kansas Reports , Vol mne 139, p . 268- 80 . 
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TEACEER COMPENSATION 
A teacher is entitled to receive reasonable value for services 
if he is not working under a written contract. In a case before t he 
court in 1871, Larkin Jones v . School District No. 47, the court af-
firmed the judgment of the district court reversing the judgment of 
the justice of peace . 'Jones brought suit before a justice of the 
peace against School District No. 47 Neosho Co., to recover $150 alleged 
to be due him as assignee of H.c.w. for three months' services of said 
H.c.w. e.s a teacher of the district school under 'a certain contract' 
made by and between the district board of said School District No. 47 
and said H.C.W. The defendant e.ppeared specially and moved to dismiss 
the action, because, 1st, the justice had no jurisdiction, the amount 
claimed being over one hundred dollars; 2d, the contract sued was not 
in writing. The justice overruled the motion, e.nd on final hearing 
gave judgment for plaintiff for $150. The defendant removed the cause 
to the district court by petition in error, when said judgment, at t he 
March tenn, 1871, was reversed. Jones thereupon asked that the distri ct 
court retain said action ' for trial and final judgment for costs given 
against plaintiff . ' 1 Jones now brings the case here on error.' The 
opinion of the court was delivered by Brewer, J.: 
1. Kansas Reports , Volume 8, p . 362. 
' ••••••• The bill of particular filed with the 
justice alleged a teacher's contract with the dis-
trict, but whether written or verbal was not dis-
closed. The testimony showed that it was verbal. 
Section 5, p. 925, Gen. Stat., requires teachers' 
contracts to be in writing. It does not follow 
from this that the district can have the benefit of 
the teacher's services without compensating him 
therefor. The teacher or his assignee can recover 
of the district, not the stipulated price but the 
reasonable value of the services actually perform-
ed. The law implies a contract from the doing and 
accepting of work. 
The judgment of the district court reversing the 
judgment of the justice will be affirmed, and the 
order of the court overruling the motion of the 
plaintiff to have the cause retained for trial will 
be reversed and the case remanded for further pro-
ceedings, in accordance vrith this opinion. The costs 
in this court vdll be charged against the defendant. 
All the Justices concurring . 1 2 
vO 
In en action by a teacher for salary, dismissal f'or incompetency 
is held good defense. In a case before the court in 1883 as explained 
in Chapter III, (School District v. McCoy), McCoy brought suit against 
School District No. 23, in Bourbon county, to recover for wages claimed 
by him as a teacher in said district . The opinion of the court was de-
livered by Valentine, J.: 
'This was an action brought in the district court 
of Bourbon county by Joseph McCoy against School 
District No . 23 of that county, to recover for wages 
claimed by him as a school teacher in such district 
from January 4, 1881, up to the time of the commence-
ment of this action, on March 25, 1881, at $40 per 
month. The case was tried before the court and a 
jury# and a verdict end judgment were rendered in fa-
vor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for 
$115 and costs. The defendant brings the case to this 
court for review. 
2. Kansas Reports, Volume 8, P• 362-5. 
•••••••••• the directors of a school district may 
undoubtedly discharge a school teacher for incompeten-
cy or neglect of duty; but afterward, if they are sued 
by the teacher for the sum agreed to be paid him, it 
devolves upon the directors to show that the teacher 
was dismissed for incompetency or neglect of duty, and 
that in fact he was incompetent, or that he neglected 
his duty. 
Af'ter a careful examination of this case, we are 
satisfied that the district court erred, and that 
its judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded 
for a new trial. 
All the Justices concurring. 13 
a9 
A wrongfully discharged teacher may recover the balance due on a 
contract. This point was determined by the court in 1895. The case 
was 'The Board of Education of the City of Ottawa v . Jennie Cook.' The 
opinion of the court was delivered by Dennison, J .: 
' Thi s action was brought in the district court of 
Franklin county by Jennie Cook, as plaintiff, against 
the Board of Education of the city of Ottawa, Kansas, 
as defendant, to recover the amount claimed to be due 
her as wages under a cont act to teach in the public 
schools of Ottawa. The r ecord discloses the fact that 
she was elected by the board to teach in the schools 
for the school year of 1890- 1 91 at $45 per month, and 
that she accepted the employment and entered upon her 
duties and taught for 6½ months. The board paid her 
for six months' service only.' 
Miss Cook was dismissed at the end of the 6½ months period . The 
board did not pay her for the last two weeks she taught. The district 
court found in favor of Miss Cook. This decision was affirmed by the 
Kansas Courts of Appeals . Continuing the opinion of the court: 
' The amount of $22.50, and interest thereon, is 
therefore due Miss Cook, even if the contention of 
3. Kansas Reports, Volume 30, P• 268-78. 
the counsel for the boar d t hat it had discretion-
ary power to remove without cause be correct . There 
was no er ror committed by the court in the instruc-
tions given. 
The judgment of the di strict court is affirmed. 
All t he Judges concurring. 1 4 
A school board may pay teachers for time while school is dismissed 
for a holiday. In a case before the Kansas Courts of Appeals in 1898, 
the decision of the district court was reversed, and this decision given. 
The case was ' The Board of Education of the City of Emporia et al. v . 
The State of Kansas, ex rel . , etc . ' 
The board of education, of the City of Emporia, pursuant to the 
Thanksgiving proclamation of the president of the United States and of 
the governor of the state of Kansas, determined to close the schools of 
the city on Thanksgiving day, Thursday, November 29, 1894, to enable 
the school childr en, with their parents, to observe the day in accord-
ance with the general custom of the country . The board deemed it ad-
visable to have the schools closed on the next day also, and so ordered. 
The schools were accordingly closed on Thanksgiving day until the 
following Monday. The board intended to pay the teachers of the schools 
the regular salary for the month of November without making any deduc-
tion on account of the two days during which the schools were to be 
closed as aforesaid, and this action was brought on November 26 , 1894, 
to prevent such payment . The teachers did not request that the schools 
be closed, nor did they consent thereto, but, on the contrary, they ob-
4 . Kansas Courts of Appeals , Volume 3, p . 269- 74 . 
jected to suoh intermission if they would thereby lose their wages for 
the time. The opinion of the court was delivered by Milton, J.: 
1 •••••••••• If the board acted within the limits 
of its lawf'ul power and discretion in dismissing the 
schools for the two days, its obligation to pay the 
teachers is a necessary inference . The judgment of 
the district court is reversed, and the cause remand-
ed for further proceedings in acoordanoe with the 
views herein expressed.' 
A director of a school board does not h~ve to sign a warrant when 
there is a dispute as to the teacher's salary. In the case before the 
court in 1904, John W. Davis v. Nellie Jewett, the supreme court re-
versed the decision of the district court in favor of the plaintiff, 
Nellie Jewett, a teacher . The court decided a proceeding in mandamus 
cannot be maintained against the director of a school district to com-
pel him to sign a warrant drawn by the clerk on the treasurer for a 
teacher's salary when there is a controversy over the right of the 
teacher to compensation., and when the director has not been ordered by 
a district meet ing or the district boa.rd to sign the warrant . The opin-
ion of the court was delivered by Smith, J .: 
' Nellie Jewett, defendant in error, entered into 
a written contract with school district No . 75, in 
Johnson county, to teach for a term of seven months, 
beginning on September 16, 1901, at a monthly salary 
of forty dollars. The contra.ct contained this pro-
viso: 'In case said teacher fails to give satisfac-
tion to a majority of board at end of any month, 
shall be legally dismissed from school , t hen said 
teacher shall not be entitled to compensation from 
and after such dismissal .' John w. Davis , plaintiff 
in error, was director of the school district, c. E. 
5. Kansas Courts of Appeals , Voliune 7, P• 620-5 . 
Jewett, clerk, and Mollie E. Watson, treasurer . On 
Januar y 3 , 1902, a writ ten notice was served on Miss 
Jewett , signed by the director and treasurer, inform-
ing her that she had failed to give satisfaction to 
a majority of the board and notifying her to quit and 
vacate the school on January 14, 1902, the end of the 
school month . On the date last mentioned the school-
house was locked with a padlock, but the teacher gained 
entrance to the building and continued to teach there-
in. The controversy was over the nonpayment of salary 
for three months ' service, following the order of dis-
missal mentioned . Defendant in error was plaintiff 
below, and brought this proceeding in mandamus to com-
pel Davis , the director of the school district, to 
sign two warre.nts, aggr egating ~~120, which had been 
theretofore drawn on the treasurer by the clerk in 
her favor , and signed by the latter . A preemptory 
writ was awarded by the court below, the director, 
Davis, has come here by proceedings in error • 
• ••• • ••• • • It seems that the court below tried the 
question of the liability of the school district tmder 
the contract of employment. The plaintiff below had 
no judgment against the district. Her right to re-
cover was resisted because the board asserted the le-
gal r ight to terminate the contract at the time it 
did so by virtue of the conditions contained in it. 
Plaintiff had a plain and adequate remedy at le:w by 
action on the contract t o recover what ·she claimed 
was due •••••• • •••••• • 
It is the duty of the director of a school district 
to sign all orders drawn by the clerk on the treasurer 
when they are ordered drawn by a district meeting or 
t he di stri ct board . No such authority was shown to 
have been given by the board to the director, Davis , 
to sign the school warrants in favor of Miss Jewett, 
and , in the absence of such authorization, it would 
have been a clear violation of duty on his part to do 
so • • • • ••••••••••• 
The judgment of the court below is reversed, with 
directions to proceed further in accordance with this 
opinion. 
All the Justices concurring. 16 
A teacher prevented from t eaching by a school board closing schools 
6 . Kansas Reports , Volume 69, P• 651-4 . 
during an epidemic can recover full salary. A teacher is entitled to 
salary for full term where board closes school a month early . These 
points were affirmed in the case before the court in 1913, S8Ill J . Smith, 
Appellant, v . School District No. 64, Appellee . The opinion of the 
court was delivered by Porter, J.: 
' The plaintiff, who is appellant, was employed 
to teach school at a salary of $55 per month . The 
action is to recover for two months ' salary . A 
copy of the written contract between the board and 
the plaintiff was attached to the petition, and it 
was alleged that plaintiff had been able, ready and 
willing at all times to perform his part of the con-
tract and had per formed the same ; and that the board 
had failed to pay two months of the salary agreed 
upon. The answer set up a general denial and a fur-
ther defense, admitting the execution of the writ'ten 
contr act for a seven- months school, but alleging 
that the plaintiff had failed to teach two months 
of the term. On the trial, which was to the court, 
it was shown by the plaintiff ' s testimony that the 
school opened September 26 , 1910, and continued un-
til February 9, when it was closed by order of the 
board on account of siclmess among the scholars. It 
reopened March 14., and continued until April 11., at 
which t ime., over appellant 's objections ., the board 
ordered the term finally closed on the ground that 
it was getting late and that a good many of the boys 
were needed for farm work . It appeared that plain-
tiff was ready and willing to complete the full term 
and had been paid for five months only. In his testi-
mony he admitted., in substance, that the board was 
willing to pay him for the sixth month, and the court 
intimated an intention to hold that he was only en-
titled t o pay for one month ; and that as he had been 
tendered an order for that month and refused to ac-
cept it the costs should be truced against him •••••••• 
It must be obvious that the boar d could not avoid li-
abi lity for payment of the salary for the full term 
by arbitrarily closing the school a month earlier 
than the contract prov-ided; and~ t hat since there was 
no express stipulation f or a deduction from the com-
pensation agreed upon by reason of the closing of the 
school during the prevalence of a contagious disease 
in the community, the plaintiff was entitled to his 
salary for that month •• •••• • •••• •• • •• 
The judgment will be reversed and the cause re-
manded with directions to render judgment for the 
plaintiff for the £Ull.ouht prayed for. 1 7 
It is within power of a school district to tenninate a teacher's 
contract because of insufficient :funds, where the teacher's contract 
provided that it 'may be terminated by either party on tgi rty days' 
notice when there exists some reasonable ground therei'or.' The action 
in terminating the contract must be in good faith., and timely notice 
given of its termination. These are points brought out by the court 
in a case before it in 1924. The case was: Daisy Brown, Appellant., v. 
The Board of Education of the City of Bonner Springs, Appellee. Miss 
Brown was informed by the superintendent of schools that her ser,rices 
would not be needed because of insufficient funds after she had con-
tracted to teach in the school t h following year. The opinion of the 
court was delivered by Hopkins., J.: 
1 The action was one to recover on a school 
teacher's contract . The defendant prevailed and 
plaintiff appeals . 
The case was tried on an agreed statement of 
facts ., which showed that on April 3, 1921., the 
plaintiff and defendant entered into a writ;ten 
con·t;ract whereby the plaintiff agreed to teach 
music in the public schools of Bonner Springs for 
the year beginning September 5., 1921., at a salary 
of $135 per month . The contract contained this 
provision : ' Fifth. That this contract may be 
terminated by e i ther party on thirty days 1 notice 
in writing t o be given by the party desiring such 
termination, and only when there exists some reason-
able ground therefor ., excepting that this contract 
7. Kans as Reports ., Volume 89 ., p . 225- 9. 
may be terminated at any time by mutual consent of the 
parties thereto.'• • •••• • •• •••••• • • •• 
The plaintiff contends that the contract was can-
celled for the convenience and whim of the board of 
education; that the notice given her in no way fell 
within the provisions of the contract providing for 
cancellation, and that there was no evidence of a 
reasonable excuse for cancelling the contract •• ••• • • • 
••• fair interpretation of the contract in contro-
versy indicates that either party under the fifth 
cl ause might cancel it, if acting in good faith and 
for reasonable cause . There is no allegation or proof 
indicating bad faith on the part of the defendant 
board, and bad faith cannot be assumed. 
The judgment is affirmed. 18 




CHAPTER II, TEACEER CONTRACTS . 
A. A contract with one member of a school district boa.rd is in-
sufficient . 
B. A contract signed by tv,o members of a school district board 
i n the absence of each other is not binding. 
c. It is sufficient that a contract be reduced to writing after 
the board has adjourned if made in parol before . 
D. A contract between the teacher and the school board must be 
in writing. 
E. A provision in a teacher's contract for discharge if not 
satisfactory to the school board is valid. 
F. If all members of a school board agree to hire a certain 
teacher, but one of the members is absent when contract is 
made , the contract is nevertheless good . 
G. A teacher suing on a contract must prove the authority of the 
officers signing _for the school district. 
H. An invalid contract will become binding on the board by rati-
fying it in accepting a teacher . 
I . Where a teacher is allowed t o teach, and paid, a school board 
waives irregularities in employing her . 
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J. Misrepresentation of the teacher that she held a certificate 
is equivalent to misrepresentation as to educational qualifi-
cations and contract is rendered unenforceable . 
K. A valid contract cannot be made prior to the annual April 
meeting unless the school has ten or more teachers. 
L. Oral acceptance of a contract is insui'ficient. The contract 
must be written and signed by both parties. 
M. If the contract contains a provision that marriage during the 
school term would terminate the contract; the fact that marriage 
is performed before the term began is no excuse. 
N. A contract executed at a meeting of a board outside the terri-
torial limits of the district is void. 
o. Consolidation of districts rendering teachers' services un-
necessary does not relieve a district of its contractual li-
ability. 
CHAPTER III, TEACHER DISMISSAL AND ffi~OVAL . 
A. A contract may reserve the right to discharge the te~cher at 
any time she fails to give satisfaction . 
B. By contract 6 a school board may discharge a teacher for in-
competency after giving notice thereof . 
c. The formality of a court is not required in the procedure for 
the dismissal of a teacher by a school board. 
D. If a teacher's contract provides for removal by the vote of 
the board1 the teacher is r emovable without cause . 
E. The act of a board in dismissing a teacher is conclusive in 
the absence of fraud , corruption~ or oppression. 
F. The school board and the county superintendent constitute 
proper tribunal to determine a teacher's dismissal . 
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G. The unanimous decision of the county superintendent and two 
members of a board is sufficient for the dismissal of a teach-
er . 
H. The conduct of a teacher in extending a vacation without con-
sent of the board is a question of negligence . 
CHAPTER TV 1 TEACHER COMPENSATION. 
A. A teacher is entitled to receive reasonable value for services 
if not working under a WYitten contract . 
B. In an action by the teacher for salary~ dismissal by board 
for incompetency is held good defense . 
c. A wrongfully discharged teacher may recover the balance due 
on a c<bntract . 
D. A school board may pay teachers for the time while school is 
dismissed for a holiday. 
E. A director does not have to sign a warrant for salary when 
there is a dispute as to the teacher's salary unless given 
authority by a district meeting or the school board. 
F. A teacher prevented frrnn teaching by the board closing schools 
during an epidemic can recover full salary. 
G. A teacher is entitled to salary for full term where a board 
closes school month early. 
H. It is within the power of a school district to terminate a 
teacher's contract because of insufficient funds, if the con-
tract contains a provision to that effect. 
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